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Note
UNITED STATES v. MANDEL:
THE MAIL FRAUD AND EN BANC PROCEDURAL ISSUES
INTRODUCTION
When Governor Marvin Mandel and his five codefendants were convicted of
mail fraud1 and racketeering,2 Maryland politics seemed hopelessly corrupt. In
a space of five years Marylanders had seen one of their United States senators,
their former governor, and then their sitting governor haled into federal court
on criminal charges.3 Yet United States v. Mandel4 is disturbing, not merely
because it suggests that Marylanders again were victimized by one of their top
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice
or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail
matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or
takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be
delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is
directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or
thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 provides in pertinent part:
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity
...to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct
or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through
a pattern of racketeering activity ...
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976). Racketeering activity is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 to include:
(A) any act or threat involving .. .bribery . ..which is chargeable under State
law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is
indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: ...
section 1341 (relating to mail fraud) ...
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976). Section 1961 further specifies that a " 'pattern of racketeering
activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity . . . the last of which occurred
within ten years . . . after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity . 18
U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976).
3. Maryland's Senator Daniel Brewster was convicted of accepting an illegal
gratuity on November 17, 1972. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1972, at 1, col. 2. Former Governor
Spiro Agnew pled no contest to a charge of income tax evasion on October 10, 1973. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 11, 1973, at 1, col. 4. Finally, a federal jury found Governor Marvin Mandel
guilty of mail fraud and racketeering on August 23, 1977. N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1977, at 1,
col. 6.
4. 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), vacated on rehearing by an equally divided court, 602
F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
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officials, but also because it raises doubts whether the defendants received a fair
trial and whether they were properly sent to jail after half the Fourth Circuit,
sitting en banc, voted to reverse their convictions.
Doubt concerning the fairness of the Mandel trial arises in connection with
two of three theories on which the mail fraud charges were submitted to the
jury. Because the case was presented to the jury on alternative theories, it is
impossible to know which, or what combination of these theories, the jurors
adopted. Consequently, the guilty. verdicts may reflect the jurors' finding that
Mandel was bribed by his codefendants, that he and his codefendants withheld
material information from government officials, or that the defendants made
false representations in order to obtain benefits from governmental bodies.5 If
the verdicts rested on either the first or second of these theories, the defendants
may have been unjustly convicted. The bribery theory was inadequately
explained to the jury,6 and the theory that the defendants defrauded the public
of material information was rife with conceptual problems.7 Nonetheless, the
Fourth Circuit eventually ratified all three theories as well as the ways in
which they were presented to the jury.8
Of the issues raised on appeal, the question whether the jury instructions
adequately explained the bribery theory was the most troublesome for the court.
Initially a three judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed the convictions, holding that the bribery instruction was inadequate.9
Upon rehearing by the court en banc, the Fourth Circuit was evenly divided on
this issue; accordingly, the convictions were affirmed by the equally divided
court. 10
5. See notes 41 to 51 and accompanying text infra.
6. See notes 114 to 122 and accompanying text infra.
7. See notes 123 to 153 and accompanying text infra.
8. United States v. Mandel, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
9. 591 F.2d at 1565.
10. 602 F.2d at 653.
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The question remains whether the defendants were properly convicted
under the mail fraud statute. 1 First, the body of mail fraud case law 12 and the
Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Arthur13 suggest that the
defendants were entitled to a bribery instruction as requested in connection
with the mail fraud counts. Second, the Fourth Circuit's analysis of the mail
fraud statute as it applies to schemes to conceal material information from
government officials was surprisingly superficial. The court failed to deal with
the question whether the allegedly concealed information was "material" and
11. This Note will focus on the alleged mail fraud violations, because the mail fraud
counts were the nucleus of the Government's case against Mandel and his codefendants. In
fact, in order to obtain racketeering convictions, the Government had to prove that the
defendants were engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity, i.e., that they had
committed at least two acts of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-62 (1976). The two
types of racketeering activity alleged in the indictment were violations of the mail fraud
statute and violations of the Maryland bribery law. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 23 (1976 &
Cum. Supp. 1980). There is no way of knowing whether the jurors premised the
racketeering verdicts on violations of the mail fraud statute, the Maryland bribery law, or
both. Accordingly, if the mail fraud convictions are suspect, as this Note suggests, then the
racketeering convictions are also suspect.
The crime of mail fraud has two elements: a fraudulent scheme and use of the
mails in furtherance of that scheme. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976); see also note 65 infra. This
Note is concerned with the first element only. It examines the Fourth Circuit's use of
various theories that the evidence in Mandel demonstrated schemes cognizable under the
mail fraud statute.
Some issues raised by Mandel are beyond the scope of this Note. They include:
(1) whether the prosecution of the Mandel case represented an impermissible
federal intrusion in the political affairs of the State of Maryland. The panel held that the
mail fraud prosecution was not inconsistent with principles of federalism, because it was
addressed to misuse of the mails, a matter of legitimate federal concern. 591 F.2d at
1357-59. See Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393 (1916). But see Comment,
Federal Prosecution of Elected State Officials for Mail Fraud: Creative Prosecution or an
Affront to Federalism, 28 AM. U.L. REV. 63 (1978). See generally Schwartz, Federal
Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutor's Discretion, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 64 (1948);
see also National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), in which the Court held
that principles of federalism limit congressional authority to regulate commerce. This
opinion may indicate that congressional authority to regulate the mails may be similarly
limited;
(2) whether the testimony of various legislators was inadmissible as hearsay
when they testified to rumors regarding Mandel's position on two pieces of legislation
affecting the owners of Marlboro Race Track. See United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d at
1367-70, 1382-85 (discussions of the hearsay issue in majority and dissenting panel
opinions); and
(3) whether the trial judge erred in giving a modified Allen charge referring to
the time and expense incurred by both the Government and the defense in trying the
case. See United States v. Smith, 303 F.2d 341, 342-43 (4th Cir. 1962) (suggesting that
references to expense and inconvenience of a retrial are improper); Note, The Allen
Charge: Recurring Problems and Recent Developments, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296 (1972);
Note, Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite: A Critical Look at the "Allen Charge", 31 U. Cm.
L. REV. 386 (1964); Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy and the Hung Jury: A
Re-examination of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REV. 123 (1967).
12. See notes 84 to 90 and accompanying text infra.
13. 544 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1976).
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the question whether Mandel's codefendants, as private citizens, had any
obligation to disclose the information, even if it was material.
The Court of Appeals' en banc procedure also demands scrutiny. Even
though the court could not reach a majority decision, it reinstated the district
court judgment. This is what federal courts of appeal usually do when they find
themselves evenly divided in an en banc rehearing.14 Arguably, this procedure
is inherently unfair to a criminal defendant, for it means that he will be
sentenced in accordance with a guilty verdict that one half of the en banc judges
consider fatally defective. Furthermore, the decision of an equally divided en
banc court is always unsatisfactory because such a decision has no precedential
value.15 It leaves the law of the circuit unsettled, and uncertainty in the
criminal law is particularly disturbing.
In light of the problems that attend the practice of affirming criminal
convictions by equal divisions, it is hard to imagine that any appellate court
would let an equal division stand if it had a legitimate means of breaking the
deadlock. Yet the Fourth Circuit rejected the defendants' petition for a second
en banc rehearing of Mandel, although the court was assured of reaching a
majority decision in a second rehearing.16 It is difficult to understand the court's
refusal to decide the issues presented by this case.
Although neither the en banc decision nor the panel decision has
precedential value, it is nevertheless worthwhile to explore the Fourth Circuit's
treatment of the mail fraud issues in Mandel in order to evaluate whether these
defendants were treated fairly. Moreover, because at least five of the six en banc
judges apparently agreed that the mail fraud counts could properly have been
submitted to the jury on three theories,1 7 the court's reasoning in connection
with those theories, deserves attention. If it prejudiced the Mandel defendants,
it may prejudice future defendants.
I. THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CASE
A. The Indictment
The indictment in Mandel alleged that the defendants had used the mails to
execute two sorts of schemes contemplated by the mail fraud statute - a
scheme to obtain money or property by means of false representations and a
scheme to defraud. 8 It charged Marvin Mandel, Eugene Cory, Dale Hess,
William Rodgers, Harry Rodgers, and Irvin Kovens with devising a scheme to
obtain "money, property, and other things of value, by means of false . . .
representations, and the concealment of material facts relating to Marlboro
Race Track, the Security Investment Company, Ray's Point, Inc., and to other
matters."1 9 In addition, the defendants were accused of devising a scheme to
14. See note 178 and accompanying text infra.
15. See note 175 and accompanying text infra.
16. See text accompanying notes 190 to 192 infra.
17. See text accompanying notes 60 to 64 infra.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
19. 591 F.2d at 1353 (majority panel opinion).
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defraud the citizens of Maryland of their right to Mandel's loyal and faithful
services and of their right to have government officials made aware of facts
material to governmental decisions.
20
The indictment also alleged in some detail the various defendants' roles in
the schemes charged. According to the indictment, Mandel's role was to use his
official position to further the financial interests of his codefendants, particular-
ly their interests in Marlboro and Bowie Race Tracks, in return for a series of
financial benefits that flowed to Mandel from his codefendants. His
codefendants' roles were described variously as providing financial benefits to
Mandel, providing financial backing for the business entities involved in the
allegedly corrupt relationship, and concealing the financial interests of the
defendants in Marlboro and Bowie Race Tracks.
21
B. The Evidence
Although the defense and the prosecution battled over whether the evidence
at trial demonstrated schemes cognizable under the mail fraud statute, the facts
presented by the Government were largely undisputed by the defense. For
instance, most of the evidence relating to Marlboro and Bowie Race Tracks was
uncontroverted. 22 This evidence demonstrated that Mandel's codefendants
concealed the true owners of Marlboro and Bowie from the General Assembly
and the Maryland Racing Commission and that, as owners of the tracks, at least
three of the defendants received substantial benefits from the decisions of these
governmental bodies.
23
In December 1971, a group including Hess and the Rodgers brothers
purchased Marlboro Race Track. One year latter, Marlboro and Bowie merged,
the Marlboro owners taking a thirty percent interest in the new corporation.
Between December 1971 and the spring of 1975, neither the General Assembly
20. Id.
21. Record, vol. 51B, at 11475-76 (summary of indictment in the charge to the jury).
22. Since much of the evidence adduced at trial concerned Marlboro and Bowie Race
Tracks, a cursory understanding of the Maryland racing industry may help to put this
evidence in perspective. The State of Maryland takes a percentage of the profits from
horse racing in Maryland, and the industry is regulated by the Maryland General
Assembly and the Maryland Racing Commission. During the years involved in this
prosecution, the General Assembly allotted to each track the number of days on which it
could hold races, but the Racing Commission determined the specific days on which each
track would race. Although one track's racing days could be run for two years or less at
another track, the permanent transfer of racing days required the approval of the General
Assembly. A track's racing days are its most valuable asset, for the profit realized by a
race track is a function of the number of days on which it holds races. Moreover, races
conducted at mile tracks like Bowie are substantially more lucrative than races run at
half mile tracks like Marlboro. Thus a track maximizes its profits by obtaining as many
racing days as possible and running as many of them as it can on one mile tracks. Main
Brief for Appellants at 23; Appellee's Brief at 9.
23. 591 F.2d at 1354-57.
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nor the Racing Commission was told who Marlboro's true owners were.24 In fact,
Eugene Casey, the president of Marlboro, and Irving Schwartz, a part owner,
falsely told the General Assembly that they were the sole owners of Marlboro.
Moreover, defendant Cory, acting as attorney for the Marlboro owners, gave the
Racing Commission a list of Marlboro stockholders that was, in reality, a list of
nominees. During this same period the General Assembly gave Marlboro
eighteen extra racing days, and the Racing Commission granted Marlboro
permission to race eighteen of its thirty-six days at Laurel and Pimlico, more
lucrative one mile tracks. Finally, the General Assembly approved the transfer
of all Marlboro's racing days to Bowie, the one mile track in which the Marlboro
owners held interests by virtue of the 1972 merger.
25
The Government and the defense argued about the implications of this
evidence. The Government maintained that all the defendants, including
Mandel, were involved in concealing the identities of Marlboro's owners and
that this was both a scheme to obtain valuable benefits by false representations
and a scheme to defraud the public of information material to governmental
decisions.26 The defense, on the other hand, contended that there was nothing
dishonest about concealing this information, because during the period in
question, Maryland law did not require disclosure of a race track's beneficial
ownership,27 and it was common practice for race track owners to submit lists of
nominees to the Racing Commission.2' Finally, defendant Kovens denied that
he owned any part of Marlboro, 29 and Mandel denied knowing who the Marlboro
owners were at that time.
30
The Government also established that Mandel received a series of financial
benefits from his codefendants and that they, in turn, profited from some of his
official actions. Throughout his term as governor, Mandel received a series of
24. During the 1974 session, the General Assembly enacted a statute requiring
yearly disclosure of beneficial interests in Maryland's race tracks. MD. ANN. CODE art.
78B, § 13(c)(1) (1980). Marlboro's owners complied early in 1975. In February, Cory wrote
the secretary of the corporation formed by the merger of Marlboro and Bowie, detailing
the beneficial interests of Hess, the Rodgers brothers, and himself. These interests were
noted in the Racing Commission's 1974 audit, released in early spring of 1975. Main Brief
for Appellants at 36; Appellee's Brief at 26.
25. 591 F.2d at 1354-57; Main Brief for Appellants at 24-35; Appellee's Brief at
10-26.
26. Record, vol. 51B, at 11525-29 (statement of the Government's theory in the
charge to the jury).
27. 591 F.2d at 1355; see note 24 supra.
28. 591 F.2d at 1355.
29. Irving Schwartz was a member of the group that purchased Marlboro in 1971.
Although the Government contended that he was merely a nominee for defendant Kovens,
who provided a large portion of his financial backing, 591 F.2d at 1354, Kovens denied
holding any interest in Marlboro. Record, vol. 51B, at 11547 (statement of Koven's theory
in the charge to the jury).
30. Record, vol. 51B, at 11530 (statement of Mandel's theory in the charge to the
jury).
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expensive gifts from Kovens, Hess, and the Rodgers brothers.3 ' Moreover,
around the same time Mandel's codefendants were buying Marlboro, Hess and
the Rodgers brothers assigned Mandel a fifteen percent interest in a corporation
owning Ray's Point, a valuable piece of real estate on Maryland's Eastern
Shore.32 One month later, in January 1972, the legislature overrode Mandel's
veto of a bill giving Marlboro eighteen extra racing days.33 There was evidence
that a number of Mandel's usual supporters uncharacteristically voted for the
override34 and that various legislators had the impression that Mandel would
not care if his veto was overridden.
35
Later in the 1972 session, Mandel worked for passage of a race track
consolidation bill, a bill that, had it passed, would have given Marlboro
fifty-eight additional racing days.36 While this bill was before the legislature,
Hess agreed to assign Mandel a four percent interest in the Security Investment
Corporation, which owned the Social Security buildings in Baltimore and leased
them to the federal government for a substantial yearly profit.
3 7
31. The gifts were undisputed; they included over $2,500.00 worth of clothing and a
$4,500.00 diamond bracelet for Mandel's first wife. Main Brief for Appellants at 19-21.
Furthermore, Kovens posted $155,000.00 for Mandel's divorce settlement, although the
defense maintained that this was a loan and that Mandel executed a long-term note to
Kovens to cover the loan. Id. at 21. Kovens also arranged for $57,000.00 in loans from the
Pallotine Brothers to cover Mandel's overdue alimony payments. Id. at 22.
32. Like the other investors, Mandel paid $1.00 per share for his 150 shares, 591 F.2d
at 1356, but he was not obligated for the mortgage on Ray's Point. His interest was valued
by the Government at $45,000.00. Appellee's Brief at 14.
The defense maintained that Mandel received his interest in Ray's Point as a
finder's fee from Hess and the Rodgers. Mandel, the defense contended, had brought them
into the Ray's Point deal. Record, vol. 51A, at 11341 (closing argument). The Government,
however, offered contradictory evidence. Nathan Cohen, another Ray's Point investor,
testified for the Government, saying Hess had told him that he wanted to include Mandel
and that allowing Mandel to participate in business ventures was one of the ways in which
he and the Rodgers brothers "[took] care of the Governor." Appellee's Brief at 14.
33. H.B. 1128 (1971).
34. Appellee's Brief at 19-20.
35. Id. at 19.
36. S.B. 928 (1972). After the bill was passed in amended form by the Senate, it was
passed in its original form by the House and returned to the Senate. However, it was
never again brought to a vote in the Senate. 591 F.2d at 1355.
37. The assignment was not actually executed until May 1972, but it was made
effective as of December 1971. Mandel's interest was worth approximately $140,000.00,
according to the Government. Appellee's Brief at 17-18.
The defense pointed out that Mandel's support for consolidation legislation
pre-dated his friends' acquisition of Marlboro. Record, vol. 51B, at 11532-33. The defense
also maintained that Mandel received the interest in Security Investment as payment of a
$15,000.00 legal fee which Hess owed for Mandel's services before he became governor. Id.
at 11537; Appellee's Brief at 28. To rebut this theory the Government offered evidence to
show that Hess and Mandel conceived this explanation only after the 1973 legislature
passed a law requiring disclosure of Mandel's personal financial interests, MD. ANN. CODE
art. 40A, §§ 4.101-4.104 (Cum. Supp. 1980), and after they learned they were under
investigation by the United States Attorney's Office. Appellee's Brief at 27-28.
The rebuttal evidence showed that the income from Security Investment was
initially represented as a dividend from another corporation on Mandel's tax return. Id. at
[VOL. 40
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Thus Mandel and his codefendants were clearly involved in a mutually
beneficial relationship. The Government characterized the relationship as a
corrupt one that deprived the public of Mandel's loyal services.3s The defense, on
the other hand, maintained that Mandel acted in the state's best interest and
that there was no connection between his official actions and his financial
relationships with his codefendants.3 9 Apparently the jury accepted the
prosecution's assessment of the evidence, for the defendants were found guilty
on fifteen of the twenty mail fraud counts and two of the racketeering counts.4 °
II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT OPINIONS IN MANDEL
A. The Fourth Circuit Panel Opinion
After reviewing the record of the Mandel trial and the case law relating to
mail fraud, Judge Widener, author of the majority panel opinion, concluded that
the evidence of mail fraud could have been submitted to the jury on either or
both of two theories:
First, that Governor Mandel had either been bribed as part of a scheme to
defraud or that attempts had been made to bribe Govenor Mandel as part of
such scheme. Second, that false information was presented to, or true
information concealed from, the Maryland General Assembly or Maryland
Racing Commission, or both, in order to induce those bodies to take
favorable action toward those interested in Marlboro, and later Bowie.41
27. Mandel explained this as a mistake by his accountants. Main Brief for Appellant at 18
n.24. The Government also demonstrated that after Hess learned he was being
investigated in the spring of 1974, he instructed his secretary to alter his business records
so that each disbursement from Security Investment to Mandel would be reflected as a
legal fee. Appellee's Brief at 29. That same spring Hess directed his secretary to drive
across town so that she could use her old typewriter to type a letter purporting to show
that Hess and Mandel had agreed in 1968 to the amount Hess owed Mandel for legal fees.
Id.
38. Record, vol. 51B, at 11525 (statement of the Government's theory in the charge to
the jury).
39. Id. at 11529-34 (statement of Mandel's theory in the charge to the jury).
40. The indictment charged the defendants with twenty counts of mail fraud. The
jury returned not guilty verdicts on three; the trial court entered judgments of acquittal on
two others. One of the four racketeering counts was dismissed before trial, and the trial
court entered a judgment of acquittal on another. 591 F.2d at 1352 n.3.
Marvin Mandel was sentenced to four years of imprisonment. Dale Hess, Harry
Rodgers, and Irvin Kovens each received a four year sentence and a $40,000 fine. William
Rodgers was sentenced to twenty months and fined $40,000. Ernest Cory received an
eighteen month sentence. The district court also ordered Mandel's codefendants to forfeit
their interests in Marlboro and Bowie Race Tracks. Id. at 1352-53. On May 1, 1980, the
defendants' jail sentences were modified. Mandel, Hess, Kovens, and Harry Rodgers each
received a one year reduction in their sentences. William Rodgers' sentence was reduced to
twelve months, and Ernest Cory's was completely suspended. N.Y. Times, May 2, 1980, at
16, col. 1. The recent decision in Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Klauber,
No. 5 (Md., February 10, 1981) indicates that Mandel's conviction for mail fraud is a crime
of turpitude and thus is a ground for disbarment.
41. 591 F.2d at 1364.
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The first theory finds ample support in a series of cases holding that schemes to
bribe public officials are schemes to defraud the public of its right to the
officials' loyal and faithful services.42 Moreover, the jurors might have found
that the evidence revealed a scheme to bribe Mandel.
The second theory, as stated, is not novel. The mail fraud statute addresses
schemes "for obtaining . . . property by means of false and fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises. 43 The evidence could have been
interpreted as demonstrating a scheme to obtain racing days and racing rights
by false representations as to who the Marlboro owners were. The extra racing
days and the right to race at more lucrative tracks were valuable assets for
Marlboro's owners;44 arguably, these assets were property. Furthermore, the
trial judge did mention this theory to the jurors. At least, he read them the mail
fraud statute and told them that the words "scheme or artifice" would include
ttany plan or course of action intended . . . to obtain money or property by
means of false . . . representations. . . .,,4' Thus the jury may have based the
mail fraud convictions on the theory that the evidence demonstrated such a
scheme.
The panel majority's second theory, however, seemed to be a bifurcated
one. In discussing it, Judge Widener said, "the scheme to defraud can in such
a case be said to encompass not only the receipt of the illicit benefit, but also the
deprivation of the public of the right to have its officials act on other than false
information. '46 The notion that the public may be defrauded of a right to have
its officials made aware of information material to governmental decisions has
its roots in a series of recent court decisions.4" The facts of those cases, however,
differed significantly from the facts of Mandel. Those cases all dealt with public
officials who concealed information about their direct financial interests in
governmental decisions.4" Moreover, the precedents indicated that the public's
right to the information was grounded in the fiduciary obligations of the public
official to the public.4 9 Yet there was no evidence that Mandel had a direct
financial interest in Marlboro or Bowie, 50 and Mandel's codefendants were not
public officials. Nonetheless, the jurors were told that "a scheme to defraud
public officials of information material to a decision which they are required to
make in their official capacity may. . . come within the meaning of scheme to
defraud as used in the mail fraud statute."51 Accordingly, the jurors may have
predicated the mail fraud convictions on the theory that the evidence
demonstrated this sort of scheme.
42. See notes 84 to 86 and accompanying text infra.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
44. See note 22 supra.
45. Record, vol. 51B, at 11487.
46. 591 F.2d at 1364 (footnote omitted).
47. See notes 91 to 99 and accompanying text infra.
48. See note 92 infra.
49. See notes 95 to 99 and accompanying text infra.
50. 591 F.2d at 1364.
51. Record, vol. 51B, at 11489.
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After exploring the various theories of the evidence of mail fraud, the panel
majority held that the trial judge had committed reversible error when he
refused the defense's request for an instruction defining bribery in connection
with the mail fraud counts. 2 The court relied on the Fourth Circuit's previous
decision in United States v. Arthur.53 In Arthur the court held that a defendant
accused of bribery is entitled to an -instruction distinguishing bribes from
legally innocent benefits. Where government officials are involved, the crucial
distinction between a bribe and a legally innocent benefit is the presence or
absence of a quid pro quo relationship between the benefit and the official's
action on behalf of the donor.54 A public official is not guilty of bribery every
time he accepts a benefit from a constituent, even when he knows that the
constituent hopes to influence his official actions. Rather, a benefit is a bribe
only when there is an understanding that it is "received by the official as a quid
pro quo for some official act, pattern of acts, or agreement to act favorably to the
donor when necessary. 55
The panel majority noted that the jurors could have based mail fraud
convictions on the evidence of a scheme to bribe Mandel and thus defraud the
public of his loyal services.56 To determine whether the evidence demonstrated
such a scheme, however, the jurors had to decide whether the benefits received
by Mandel were bribes, as the indictment alleged. Convinced that this question
was fundamental, the panel majority concluded that Arthur required an
instruction on the distinction between bribes and legally innocent benefits in
connection with the mail fraud counts.
5 7
B. The En Banc Decision on Rehearing
After an en banc rehearing of Mandel,5 the Fourth Circuit announced its
decision per curiam, saying only:
The judgments of conviction are affirmed by an equally divided court.
A majority of the members of the en banc court would affirm the
judgments of conviction against all of the contentions of the appellants
52. 591 F.2d at 1365. The majority also held that the trial judge erred in admitting
the Maryland Code of Ethics for the jury to consider in determining whether Mandel had
the intent to deceive, id. at 1366-67; in admitting hearsay testimony from various
legislators, id. at 1367-70; and in refusing to instruct the jury that Mandel could not be
convicted on the theory that he withheld information from the 1972 General Assembly
unless the jurors found that he knew the identities of Marlboro's owners during that
session, id. at 1365-66.
53. 544 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1976).
54. Id. at 735. See also United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
55. 544 F.2d at 735.
56. United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1365.
57. Id. Judge Butzner, the sole dissenter on the panel, had reasoned that a bribery
instruction was necessary, but that one given in connection with the racketeering counts
sufficed to explain the allegations of bribery in the mail fraud counts. Id. at 1377-78.
58. 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (per curiam).
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except the claim of error in the charge to the jury which was the point upon
which there was equal division.
59
Despite the brevity of this opinion, it is possible to gain some insight into the
positions of the judges by looking at the prior panel opinion and Judge
Widener's dissent from the en banc decision. Read together, the opinions suggest
that a majority of the en banc judges accepted all three of the panel's theories of
the evidence, but that they divided on whether the instructions adequately
explained these theories to the jurors.
In his dissent from the en banc decision, Judge Widener said that the judges
voting to affirm accepted the Government's argument that the bribery
instruction given in connection with the racketeering counts sufficed to inform
the jurors that the distinction between bribes and legally innocent benefits was
also pertinent to the mail fraud counts.60 Judge Widener thus indicated that the
en banc judges divided, not on the need for a bribery instruction, but on the
adequacy of the bribery instruction as given.6' The judges' apparent agreement
that the bribery instruction was relevant to the mail fraud counts suggests that
all the judges subscribed to the panel majority's theory that mail fraud
convictions properly could have been premised on the defendants' involvement
in a scheme to bribe Mandel.
59. Id. Because the court's decision has no precedential value, the second paragraph
of the per curiam decision is, Strictly speaking, dictum. W. REYNOLDS, JUDICIAL PROCESS 33
(1980). It is valuable dictum, however, for it provides an important clue to the various
judges' reasoning regarding the Mandel case as it was tried and submitted to the jury.
60. 602 F.2d at 655.
61. Although the en banc decision said that the judges were equally divided on the
jury instructions, 602 F.2d at 653, there is no way to know whether they split on both the
knowledge and the bribery instructions, or just on the bribery instruction. See note 52
supra. At any rate, the panel majority's position on the knowledge instruction is not
particularly compelling. The panel majority said Mandel was entitled to an instruction
that he could not have participated in a scheme to withhold information from the 1972
General Assembly if he did not know who owned Marlboro in 1972. 591 F.2d at 1365.
Although a criminal defendant is entitled to an instruction on any theory of the defense
for which there is a foundation in the evidence, United States v. Mitchell, 495 F.2d 285,
287-88 (4th Cir. 1974), a trial judge fulfills his obligation in this regard if he covers the
substance of the defendant's requested instruction. He is free to charge the jury in his own
words. United States v. Scheper, 520 F.2d 1355, 1357-58 (4th Cir. 1975). The trial judge
did cover the knowledge issue by pointing out that a defendant can be convicted of mail
fraud only if he acts "knowingly." Record, vol. 51B, at 11492.
In light of this charge, it is hard to imagine that the jurors could have thought
they should convict Mandel for concealing information about which he had no knowledge.
The instruction proposed by the panel majority might have been helpful in emphasizing
the importance of determining when Mandel learned of his codefendants' interest in
Marlboro. Yet to say that it might have been helpful is not to say that its omission
rendered the overall charge fatally defective. Because it is unlikely that the omission
prejudiced the defendants, it does not seem to provide grounds for reversal. See 591 F.2d at
1378-79 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
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It is reasonable to assume that at least five of the six en banc judges also
concluded that the panel majority's two other theories 62 were viable under the
mail fraud statute and the evidence in Mandel. Judges Widener and Russell
explicitly adopted these theories as members of the panel majority. Moreover,
because the jury instructions alluded to both of these theories, 63 the three en
banc judges voting to affirm apparently ratified them as well. Otherwise, they
presumably would have voted to reverse on the grounds that the charge to the
jury was erroneous. 64
If this analysis is correct, the en banc decision was questionable in two
respects. The judges who considered the bribery instruction adequate as given
overlooked relevant case law. Furthermore, the judges who endorsed the notion
that the evidence could be interpreted as demonstrating a scheme to defraud the
public of material information failed to deal with the conceptual problems
involved in applying that theory, as it had been developed in previous cases, to
the facts in Mandel.
III. THE MAIL FRAUD STATUTE AND ITS
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
An understanding of the federal mail fraud statute is essential to any
consideration of the Fourth Circuit's treatment of the mail fraud issues in
Mandel. The statute prohibits the use of the mails for the purpose of executing a
"scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of
false . . . representations .. ."65 Although the language relating to a scheme
for obtaining money or property through false representations is self-
explanatory, the "scheme to defraud" language is not. The statute does not
define a scheme to defraud, and the responsibility for determining the scope of
this language thus falls on the federal courts.
A. The Three Elements of a Scheme to Defraud Under
18 U.S.C. Section 1341
The body of mail fraud case law demonstrates that the courts have found
three elements essential to a scheme to defraud. A person devises a scheme to
defraud within the meaning of section 1341 when:
62. See text accompanying notes 43 to 51 supra.
63. See text accompanying notes 45 & 51 supra.
64. An appellate judge presumably would consider an instruction plain error if he
thought that it would allow a jury to convict a defendant for noncriminal conduct.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). The courts have repeatedly stressed that the mail fraud
statute is addressed to abuse of the mails. Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896);
United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974).
Thus in any mail fraud prosecution, the Government must prove not only that the
defendant devised a scheme cognizable under the mail fraud statute, but that he used the
mails to execute the scheme. Perierira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1. 8 (1954).
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(1) he devises a deceptive scheme;
(2) the deceptive scheme is such that, if successful, it will probably injure
another; and
(3) he intends to defraud. 66
The first element of a scheme to defraud is commonly referred to as the
"fraudulent aspect" of the scheme. The defendant need not say anything false;
he is culpable if he merely gives a false impression. As one court said:
The fraudulent aspect . . . is measured by a nontechnical standard ....
Law puts its imprimatur on the accepted moral standards and condemns
conduct which fails to match [them] . . . .All that is necessary is that it be
a "scheme reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary pru-
dence ... ,67
The injury contemplated by a section 1341 scheme to defraud is probable
injury, not actual injury. The scheme to defraud must be such that, if successful,
it would probably work an injury to some protected interest of another. 68 No
actual injury is required, because section 1341 addresses schemes to defraud,
not frauds per se. Originally the federal courts only recognized schemes
66. No court decision defines a scheme to defraud in just these words. The courts,
however, have focused on the presence or absence of these factors in judging whether
various schemes qualified as schemes to defraud. See, e.g., United States v. McNeive, 536
F.2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 977 (1976); United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174 (2d Cir.
1970). See also Comment, Survey of the Law of Mail Fraud, 1975 ILL. L.F. 237.
67. Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967). In Gregory v. United
States, for example, the defendant's mail fraud conviction was affirmed although he did
not actually say anything false. 253 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1958). Gregory had entered a
contest offering a prize to the contestant submitting the most accurate prediction of the
scores for certain football games. Instead of mailing his entries before the games were
played, Gregory, a railway postal clerk, waited until after the games were played and then
postmarked his entries with a stamp set for the previous week. Id. at 107. Observing that
Gregory had cheated and deceived those running the contest by creating the false
impression that his entries were predictions rather than reports of known events, the
court concluded that he had executed a scheme to defraud. Id. at 109. The court might
have viewed the postmark as a false statement. Instead it seemed to deliberately choose a
more far-reaching rationale for its decision - Gregory's conduct was deceitful, because it
created a false impression.
Similarly, in United States v. Keane the Seventh Circuit upheld a Chicago city
alderman's conviction under the mail fraud statute. 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976). In holding that Keane's efforts to conceal his financial
interest in matters before the city council were cognizable under the statute, the court
noted his conduct did not match commonly accepted standards of "fair play and right
dealing." Id. at 549. Accordingly, it was deceptive and within the purview of section 1341.
68. United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1005-06 n.14 (2d Cir. 1980); United
States v. Reid, 533 F.2d 1255, 1264 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Regent Office
Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1182 (2d Cir. 1970); Horman v. United States, 116 F. 350, 352
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 187 U.S. 641 (1902).
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designed to injure another economically.69 Now it is generally accepted that the
mail fraud statute also prohibits schemes to defraud others of various intangible
rights, including schemes to defraud voters of their right to an honest election,70
employers of their right to the faithful services of their employees, 71 citizens of
their right to the loyal and faithful services of public officials, 72 employers of
their right to knowledge of material information, 73 and citizens of their right to
have their officials made aware of material information.
7 4
The third and final element of a scheme to defraud is the intent to defraud.
Mail fraud is a specific intent crime.75 Even if a defendant devises a scheme
which, if successful, would injure another, he cannot be guilty of mail fraud
unless he intends to defraud. As the courts have repeatedly said, the mail fraud
statute does not reach "constructive," i.e., unintentional, frauds.
76
Because a person's intent can seldom be established by explicit proof, courts
generally assume that a person intends the natural consequences of his actions.
Thus a jury may infer a defendant's intent to deceive from his deceitful
conduct. 77 If the defendant's deceitful conduct is such that its natural tendency
69. Some federal circuit courts had previously suggested in dicta that victims of
fraudulent schemes had been defrauded of intangible rights as well as property rights. See,
e.g., Bradford v. United States, 129 F.2d 274 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 683 (1942);
Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941),
overruled on other grounds, United States v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 408, 412 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). The Eighth Circuit was the first to hold that a scheme to
defraud was cognizable under the mail fraud statute even if it contemplated no economic
injury, but simply deprived the victims of intangible rights. United States v. States, 488
F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974).
Recently one commentator has argued that the legislative history of the mail
fraud statute demonstrates that the statute was never intended to apply to schemes
depriving their victims of intangible rights only. Comment, The Intangible-Rights
Doctrine and Political-Corruption Prosecutions under the Mail Fraud Statute, 47 U. CHI.
L.R. 562 (1980). The author marshalls impressive evidence to support his conclusion. In
light of the general acceptance the doctrine of intangible rights enjoys, however, it is
unlikely that the courts will now reject it. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 71, 84 & 91 infra.
Although these cases are clustered in the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and Eighth
circuits, no circuit has held that the mail fraud statute does not apply to deprivations of
intangible rights.
70. See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 909 (1974).
71. See, e.g., United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
827 (1973); United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 47 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1942).
72. See notes 84 & 91 infra.
73. See note 71 supra.
74. See note 91 infra.
75. United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1398 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Bush,
522 F.2d 641, 648 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976).
76. See, e.g., Epstein v. United States, 174 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1949); Shushan v.
United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 649 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 977 (1976); United States v. Bryza, 522 F.2d 414, 422 (7th Cir. 1975).
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is to injure another, then the jury may infer an intent to deceive and to injure -
an intent to defraud.7 s
In order to prosecute a mail fraud case, then, the Government must
establish that the defendant used the mails to execute a deceptive scheme that,
if successful, would be likely to injure another. If the prosecution establishes
this much, the jury is entitled to infer the intent to defraud. A defendant,
however, may overcome this inference if he offers evidence of good faith.
Theoretically, a defendant might exculpate himself with evidence that he
did not intend to deceive anyone or that he did not intend to injure anyone. Yet
no appellate court has ever reversed a mail fraud conviction on the grounds that
evidence of good faith overcame the inference of an intent to defraud.79
B. The Application of Section 1341 to Political Corruption Cases
Throughout its history the mail fraud statute has been applied to schemes
to defraud others of money or property. Typically, these schemes involved
misrepresentations of facts to obtain favorable contracts,8 0 misrepresentations of
facts to avoid taxation,8 1 and misrepresentations of injuries to obtain insurance
payments.
8 2
78. See United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 514 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
827 (1973); United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1181 (2d Cir. 1970);
Silverman v. United States, 213 F.2d 405, 405-06 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828
(1954).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 977 (1976). Occasionally, however, courts have held that the evidence failed to
establish that the defendant's conduct would injure anyone and that, consequently, there
was insufficient evidence of an intent to defraud. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 536
F.2d 1388, 1398-400 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d
1174, 1182 (2d Cir. 1970); Epstein v. United States, 174 F.2d 754, 767-68 (6th Cir. 1949).
For instance, in Regent Office Supply Co., the Second Circuit carefully delineated
the distinction between an intent to deceive and an intent to defraud. The defendants
admitted that they had misrepresented their reasons for offering their products for sale.
They even admitted that they made these misrepresentations intending to induce
customers to buy their products. The defendants thus intended to deceive their customers.
They had not, however, misrepresented the quality of their products in any way. Id. at
1181-82. The court stressed that the defendants' misrepresentations had no tendency to
injure their customers, because their customers received exactly what they expected. Id. at
1182. Accordingly, their was no evidence from which a jury could infer an intent to injure.
The court concluded that the convictions should be reversed; although the defendants had
intended to deceive, they had not intended to defraud. Id.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531 (3d Cir. 1978); Blachly v.
United States, 380 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1967); Silverman v. United States, 213 F.2d 405 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 822 (1954); United States v. Rowe, 56 F.2d 747 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 286 U.S. 554 (1932).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Feinberg, 535 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 929 (1976); United States v. Mirabile, 503 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 973 (1975); United States v. Flaxman, 495 F.2d 344 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1031 (1974).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Cady, 567 F.2d 771 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944
(1978); United States v. Tiche, 424 F. Supp. 996 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 564 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.
1977).'
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In the 1970's, the mail fraud statute became a tool for the federal
prosecution of political corruption cases. The key to these prosecutions was the
gradual acceptance of the notion that section 1341 would reach fraudulent
schemes that deprived others of certain intangible rights, including a citizen's
right to have his public officials behave in certain ways. The courts looked to the
fiduciary relationship between the public official and the public. This rela-
tionship, they theorized, obliges the official to use his office to serve the public.
If he breaches his fiduciary duty, he deprives the public of his loyal and faithful
services. When this deprivation is coupled with deceit, the public is defrauded. It
is deceitful, the courts reasoned, for a public servant to perform his official
duties without disclosing that he has been compromised in performing them. By
such conduct, the official implicitly represents that he is serving the public
interest; this is a misrepresentation if he is actually pursuing his own or
someone else's interest. Accordingly, if a public official is secretly compromised
in performing his official duties, he defrauds the public of his loyal and faithful
services.83
This reasoning provided the basis for a number of decisions upholding the
convictions of defendants who participated in schemes involving bribery of
public officials. Such schemes, the courts held, defrauded the public.' The
83. This reasoning traces from the decision in United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973). Defendant Yonan, an employee of the Zenith
Corporation, arranged to buy all Zenith's cabinets from one supplier under an agreement
by which he received kickbacks on the sales to Zenith. The court held that Yonan had a
fiduciary duty to give his honest and loyal services to Zenith. This included the "duty to
negotiate the best price possible for Zenith or at least to apprise Zenith that [the supplier]
was willing to sell his cabinets for substantially less money." 477 F.2d at 513. Yonan,
however, concealed the kickbacks and "deprived Zenith of material knowledge that [the
supplier] would accept less profit." Id. The court concluded that Yonan had defrauded his
employer; he had deceived Zenith and deprived Zenith of his loyal and faithful services. Id.
Later courts found an analogue for the relationship between a public official and
the public in the relationship between an employee and his employer. Accordingly, they
applied the reasoning of George to political corruption cases. Few of the decisions focused
on the deceitful aspect of the scheme to defraud the public. But see United States v. Bush,
522 F.2d 641, 647-48 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976). Most focused on
the injury suffered by the public, perhaps because the defendants claimed that the public
had suffered no injury. See, e.g., United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1150 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). Since, however, nearly all these decisions relied on
George, presumably they adopted its reasoning as to both the deception and the injury
involved in the scheme to defraud. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 374
(8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 977 (1976); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 548-49 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976); United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091, 1104 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964 (1975); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1150 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
84. United States v. Caldwell, 544 F.2d 691, 696 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 375 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Rauhoff, 525 F.2d 1170, 1175
(7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1150 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 976 (1974). See also Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
313 U.S. 574 (1941), a pre-George decision in which, without undertaking any rigorous
analysis of the relationship between the public and its officials, the court simply observed
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deception lay in the implicit representation that the official served the public
when, in fact, he did not; the injury lay in the deprivation of the public's right to
his loyal and faithful services. Bribery of a public official deprives the public of
the official's loyal services, because it is premised on the understanding that the
official will pursue the briber's interests in return for the bribe. 5 Regardless of
whether the briber's interest conflicts with the public's, the official has violated
his fiduciary duty - he has not based his decisions entirely on the public
interest.s 6
A public official does not defraud the public by taking money in connection
with his official duties, however, unless the payment compromises him in the
exercise of those duties. Thus in United States v. McNeive,s 7 the Eighth Circuit
held that the chief plumbing inspector of St. Louis did not defraud the public
when he accepted tips from the Preston Plumbing Company for processing its
plumbing permits."8 The court stressed that issuing plumbing permits was one
of McNeive's "ministerial" duties, not a discretionary one. As plumbing
inspector, he was required to issue the permits if the applications for them were
in order. Because all Preston's applications for permits conformed to the legal
requirements for such applications, McNeive had no discretion to refuse to issue
the permits.89 The court therefore found that accepting the tips did not affect
McNeive's official actions and did not deprive the public of his loyal and faithful
services.90
Implicit in the court's analysis is the idea that a public official does not
breach his duty to serve the public, even when he accepts money from private
sources in connection with his official duties, unless the payment influences his
official actions. On the other hand, if the money does influence his official
actions, then the official has betrayed the public trust; he has subordinated the
public's interest to the payor's and to his own interest in receiving the payment.
The notion that a public official has fiduciary obligations to the public is
also basic to the theory that a public official defrauds the public when he
conceals information material to a governmental decision. A number of public
in dicta, "No trustee has more sacred duties than a public official and any scheme to
obtain an advantage by corrupting such an one [sic] must in the federal law be considered
a scheme to defraud." Id. at 115.
85. See text accompanying notes 53 to 55 supra. The term "bribery" is used here in a
broad sense to include, not only schemes predicated on a typical bribery, but also schemes
based on a kickback arrangement between a public official and a private citizen or
organization. Kickback arrangements, like bribery arrangements, compromise the official
in the performance of his duties - both subordinate the public's interest to the interests of
the official and the other party to the illicit arrangement.
86. United States v. Caldwell, 544 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1976). Even if the bribery of a
public official does not affect the public's financial interest in governmental decisions, it
nonetheless deprives the public of the official's loyal services. United States v. Isaacs, 493
F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
87. 536 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1976).
88. Id. at 1252.
89. Id. at 1246.
90. Id. at 1250-51.
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officials have been successfully prosecuted for mail fraud under this theory.9 ' In
each case the official concealed a personal financial interest in a governmental
decision and had some official connection with the decision.92 The courts have
held that the officials deprived the public, not only of its right to the officials'
loyal services, but also of its right to have government business conducted with
knowledge of all material facts.93 The decisions in these cases implied that
information about the officials' interest in governmental decisions was material
because it affected the public's financial interest.94
Yet none of these courts held or even suggested that the public had an
absolute right to all material information. Rather, they indicated that the public
has a right to such information from a government official because of the
official's fiduciary obligations to the public.95 For example, in United States v.
91. See United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 977 (1976); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 976 (1976). See generally United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964 (1975).
92. United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1976) (St. Louis Building
Commissioner extorted money from contractors whom he selected to receive invitations to
bid on city's demolition work); United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975)
(assistant to mayor of Chicago officially recommended adoption of a contract from which
he was to receive secret profits), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976); United States v. Keane,
522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975) (city alderman participated in vote to excuse portions of liens
city held on property in which he secretly held an interest), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976
(1976); United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1974) (county clerk secretly
received commissions from insurance policies he obtained for the county), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 964 (1975).
93. United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 375 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bush,
522 F.2d 641, 647-48 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976); United States v.
Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 550 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976); United States
v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091, 1104 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964 (1975).
94. For instance, in United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 977 (1976), the court reasoned that Bush should have disclosed his interest in an
advertising contract he recommended to other city officials, because the information
affected the city's financial interest in the contract. The court said:
Assuming that the city would have been willing to do business with a company owned
by Bush, the fact that Bush would be receiving profits as a result of the contract was
material to the question of what percentage of DAAI's profits should be turned over to
the city.
Id. at 647. Similarly, in United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 976 (1976), the court indicated that Keane's fellow aldermen were entitled to
know of his interest in certain properties in order to assess "the propriety of compromising
a lien of the city's special assessment fund in favor of a City alderman." Id. at 548. Again,
information about Keane's financial interest was material, because his interest affected
the public's financial interest. Thus presumably any information affecting the public's
financial interest in a governmental decision is material information. This is not to
suggest that only such information is material. The concept of materiality is explored
more fully below. See text accompanying notes 129 to 133 infra.
95. One source of authority for the notion that public officials are obliged, as
fiduciaries, to supply information material to governmental decisions is the common law
doctrine that one who occupies a position of trust may be liable in fraud for mere
nondisclosure of material facts. At common law, parties who bargain at arm's length have
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Barrett' the court held that the Cook County Clerk had been properly convicted
under section 1341 for collecting and concealing insurance commissions on
policies that he obtained for the city in his official capacity. The court noted:
[Tihe person saddled with the responsibility for devoting loyal service to his
employer concealed his secret profit from his employer and denied to that
employer the right to know that the supplier . . . was willing to continue
the supply at a discount to which the employer was entitled.
97
Thus the court suggested that the county and the public had a right to the
information because Barrett was obliged to give them his honest and loyal
services. His duty to serve the public, in other words, embraced the duty to
supply this information. The court did not specify, however, whether Barrett's
duty to disclose his commissions was tied to his responsibility for the insurance
policies or simply to his duty as a public servant.
Like Barrett, each decision that upheld the conviction of a public official for
defrauding the public of its right to information involved an official who
concealed a personal interest in a decision with which he was officially
connected. 98 The courts spoke in general terms of the officials' fiduciary
obligations to reveal information material to the conduct of government
business. 99 None of the decisions specifically linked the public's right to the
information to the defendant's official connection with the matter. Yet in United
States v. Rabbitt,100 the Eighth Circuit reversed a mail fraud conviction, partly
because this element was missing. Rabbitt, a Missouri legislator, urged a
government agency to accept architectural contracts without disclosing his
interest in the contracts."0 ' The court held that Rabbitt did not deprive the
public of its right to his loyal services, because as a legislator, Rabbitt bore no
official responsibility for awarding the contracts.
10 2
no duty to disclose information to each other; they are simply obliged not to misrepresent
material facts. The obligations of those who occupy positions of trust are more far-reaching,
however. When one bargains with a party to whom he owes fiduciary obligations, he has a
duty to disclose all facts material to the bargain. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 696-97 (4th ed. 1971); James & Gray, Misrepresentation-Part I1, 37 MD. L. REV. 488,
498 (1978). Apparently the notion is that mere nondisclosure is a misrepresentation,
because the other party is entitled to assume that the fiduciary would disclose any
information bearing on his interests.
96. 505 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964 (1975).
97. Id. at 1104.
98. See note 92 supra.
99. United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 375 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bush,
522 F.2d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976); United States v.
Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 550 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976); United States
v. Barrett, 505 F.2d at 1104.
100. 583 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
101. Id. at 1025.
102. Id. at 1026.
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Moreover, in United States v. Bush10 3 the court suggested that the
defendant's official connection with the matter was crucial; it made mere
non-disclosure of his financial interest deceitful. Bush, an assistant to the mayor
of Chicago, officially recommended acceptance of an advertising contract
without disclosing his financial interest in the contract. 10 4 Although Bush had
taken active steps to conceal his interest, 10 5 the court indicated that, under the
circumstances, his mere failure to disclose his interest was deceitful.
The court held that Bush's failure to disclose his interest was a breach of
fiduciary duty and deprived the public of its right to the information as well as
its right to his loyal and faithful services.' 0 6 It noted, however, that "[n]ot every
breach of every fiduciary duty works a criminal fraud."'0 7 Presumably the court
meant that, although the breach of an official's fiduciary duty will deprive the
public of his loyal services, the deprivation is not fraudulent unless it is part of a
deceptive scheme. Yet Bush, the court observed, "did more than breach his
fiduciary duty; he materially misrepresented his interests"'0 8 when he officially
recommended the contract, for this was an implicit representation that he was
acting as a "disinterested public servant."' 0 9 Thus the court suggested that
nondisclosure of an official's personal interest is deceptive only when the official
takes some affirmative action, ostensibly in the public interest, but actually in
his own interest. Bush's deception, coupled with the breach of his fiduciary
obligations, made his conduct fraudulent."0
The mail fraud prosecutions of political corruption cases have always been
grounded in the theory that public officials have a fiduciary obligation to serve
the public. They deceive the public if they conduct business as usual, implicitly
representing that they are serving the public when they are, in fact, serving
103. 522 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976).
104. Id. at 643-44.
105. Id.; see note 110 infra.
106. 522 F.2d at 647-48. Bush was required by statute to file a statement of economic
interest with the county clerk, and the mayor required all his staff members to file a copy
with the mayor's office. Although Bush complied with the statute by filing an accurate
statement with the county clerk, he filed an incomplete statement with the mayor's office.
The copy he submitted to the mayor's office omitted any reference to his interest in the
advertising company. Id. at 645. The court noted that his duty to disclose his interest did
not depend on the statute or the mayor's directive. Rather, it stemmed from his fiduciary
obligations as a public servant. The court observed that George established "that an
employee owes his employer a duty not to conceal facts known to him which he has reason
to believe are material to the employer's conduct of its business and affairs." Id. at 652.
This broad language indicates that the court considered Bush's obligation to be absolute,
not linked to his participation in the decision regarding the contract.
107. Id. at 647 (quoting United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508,512 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 827 (1973)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. The court said, "It is only when his failure to provide honest and faithful services
is combined with his material misrepresentations . . . and his active concealment that an
illegal fraud occurs which is cognizable under § 1341." Id. at 648. With regard to the
contract, Bush had misrepresented his position and concealed his interest in a variety of
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themselves or others. When they compromise themselves in connection with
their official duties or conceal personal interests in governmental decisions, they
deprive their constituents of cognizable rights.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FOURTH CIRcurT's TREATMENT OF
THE MAIL FRAUD ISSUES
A. The Theory That the Defendants Were Engaged
in a Bribery Scheme
The Fourth Circuit's analysis of the mail fraud issues in Mandel must be
evaluated against the background of the case law relating to mail fraud. Prior
cases holding that a scheme to bribe a public official is a scheme to defraud the
public ... support the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that under the indictment and
the evidence, mail fraud convictions properly could have been premised on a
finding that Mandel was bribed to use his office for the benefit of his
codefendants.112 The defense did not dispute that Mandel and his codefendants
had a mutually beneficial relationship. Accordingly, the crucial question for the
jury was whether the benefits received by Mandel were bribes. The judges
voting to affirm the convictions were apparently convinced that the instructions
adequately focused this question for the jury.1 13
In order to assess the reasonableness of the affirming judges' position, it is
important to know what the jury was told and when. First, in his closing
argument, the prosecutor told the jury that the "whole concept of bribery" was
relevant only to the racketeering counts.1 14 After the closing arguments, the
judge charged the jury on the mail fraud counts and noted only that the
indictment charged Mandel with assisting the financial interests of the
Marlboro owners "in return for certain financial and other benefits ... ',115 He
thus alluded to the allegations of bribery without drawing the distinction
between bribes and legally innocent benefits.
Later, when he charged the jury on the racketeering counts, the judge said
that in order to return guilty verdicts on the racketeering counts, the jurors had
to find that the defendants had committed two acts that were violations of either
ways. He had, for instance, specifically said that he had no interest in the contract. He had
also put his stock in the advertising company in the names of nominees, and he had
laundered his profits from the contract through another business. Id. at 644-45. Although
the court's language thus refers to a whole series of deceptive acts, presumably any one of
them would have made his breach of fiduciary duty fraudulent. The court went to some
effort to explain why mere nondisclosure was deceptive under the circumstances of this
case. Thus the court implied that this deception alone would have made the deprivation of
his loyal services fraudulent.
111. See cases cited in note 84 supra.
112. See text accompanying notes 41 & 60 supra.
113. See text accompanying notes 60 & 61 supra.
114. Record, vol. 51A, at 11382-83.
115. Record, vol. 51B, at 11478.
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the Maryland bribery law or the mail fraud statute."n He then explained the
quid pro quo essential to bribery as part of his instruction on the Maryland
bribery law.
1 17
The sequence in which the jurors heard these things from the prosecution
and the judge undercut the efficacy of the bribery instruction. The prosecuting
attorney predisposed the jurors to disregard the quid pro quo requirement for
bribery when they reviewed the evidence of mail fraud. Moreover, the judge said
nothing to disabuse them of the notion, suggested by the Government, that the
quid pro quo requirement was irrelevant to the mail fraud charges. In fact, he
may have reinforced this notion by omitting the bribery instruction from the
charge in connection with the mail fraud counts. Thus the jury reasonably could
have assumed that the bribery instruction was not pertinent to the mail fraud
counts. If the jurors assumed this, then they did not have the guidance required
by Arthur in evaluating the allegation that Mandel assisted the financial
interests of his codefendants "in return for" financial benefits from them.
The danger of an improper verdict was exacerbated by the format of the
trial judge's instructions on the mail fraud counts. He never explained that
proof of a scheme to defraud requires proof that a scheme is both deceptive and
injurious. In fact, at one point he told the jurors, "The Mail Fraud Statute
prohibits any scheme utilizing the mails that is reasonably calculated to deceive
persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension."" 8 The jurors easily might
have understood that instruction to mean that any deceptive scheme is a scheme
to defraud. If they concluded that the scheme to conceal the relationship among
the defendants was deceptive, they may well have thought the deception alone
provided grounds for mail fraud convictions.
The trial judge did at least refer to the notion of injury when he said that
the fraudulent deprivation of a public official's loyal services would qualify as a
scheme to defraud. 19 He did not, however, tell the jurors what Mandel's duty to
render loyal services entailed. Even if the jurors understood that a scheme to
defraud must contemplate some injury, like the deprivation of Mandel's loyal
services, they may have thought that Mandel's mere involvement in a mutually
beneficial relationship with his codefendants automatically deprived the public
of his loyal services.
Since the Government seems to have been confused on this point, the jurors
may have been similarly confused. In asking for a rehearing, the Government
argued that the jurors properly could have based guilty verdicts on evidence of a
scheme to conceal the relationship between Mandel and his codefendants, even
if the jurors did not believe that Mandel was bribed. 2 ° The Government's
argument, however, was flawed. Although a scheme to conceal the defendants'
relationship may have been deceptive, not all deceptive schemes are schemes to
116. Id. at 11501.
117. See id. at 11503-07.
118. Id. at 11488.
119. Id.
120. Petitioner's Reply to Answer to Petition for Rehearing at 3-4.
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defraud. A scheme to defraud must also involve some injury. A mutually
beneficial relationship between a public official and a private citizen deprives
the public of the official's loyal services only if the relationship is predicated on
bribery. Bribery compromises the official in the performance of his duties.
1 21
Absent bribery, however, the relationship does not compromise the official.
Accordingly, it does not deprive the public of his loyal services.
122
As this discussion demonstrates, the evidence that the defendants concealed
their relationship was not evidence of a scheme to defraud unless the
relationship involved bribery. Had the trial judge given a bribery instruction in
connection with the mail fraud counts, he could have focused this issue for the
jurors and obviated the risk of improper verdicts.
B. The Theory That The Defendants Were Involved
In a Scheme to Defraud the Public of
Its Right to Information
If properly instructed, the jury might have found the defendants guilty of
mail fraud on the theory that the evidence revealed a scheme to defraud the
public of Mandel's loyal services through bribery. There are significant
problems, however, with another theory on which the mail fraud counts were
submitted to the jury - the theory that in concealing information about the
true owners of Marlboro, the defendants defrauded the public of its right to have
government officials made aware of information material to governmental
decisions. It is doubtful that this theory was even applicable to the facts of
Mandel.
Although there are a series of cases holding that the Mail Fraud Statute
reaches schemes to defraud the public of its right to information, 123 the facts in
Mandel differ from the facts of the cases in which this theory was formulated.
The precedents all dealt with public officials who concealed their financial
interests in matters for which they bore official responsibility. 124 Thus these
precedents do not apply directly to the Mandel case, not even to the prosecution
of Mandel, the only defendant who was a public official. Mandel was accused of
concealing the identities of the Marlboro owners from the General Assembly
and the Racing Commission, thereby depriving the public of information
121. See notes 84 to 86 and accompanying text supra.
122. The courts have recognized only two grounds for holding that the public was
deprived of an official's loyal services: (1) that the official was compromised in performing
his official functions, see text accompanying notes 83 to 90 supra, or (2) that the official
withheld information material to a governmental decision, see text accompanying notes 91
to 110 supra. Unless Mandel was compromised in his official capacity by his relationship
with his codefendants, the mere existence of that relationship did not deprive the public of
his loyal services. Still, if information about the relationship was material to governmen-
tal decisions, then by withholding such information, Mandel might have defrauded the
public of his loyal services. For an analysis of the criticism to which that theory would be
prone, see notes 129 to 136 and accompanying text infra.
123. See cases cited in note 91 supra.
124. See note 92 supra.
[VOL. 40
UNITED STATES V. MANDEL
material to governmental decisions about the Maryland horse racing
industry. 25 As governor, Mandel was officially concerned with matters before
the General Assembly. 2 6 If he concealed information, however, it was
information about third parties' interests in Marlboro, not about his own
interest in the track.
1. Mandel and the Public's Right to Information
There is no precedent for the proposition that a public official defrauds the
public by concealing information about a third party's interest in a governmen-
tal decision. Nonetheless, if Mandel knew the identities of the Marlboro owners
and if that information was material to governmental decisions, then arguably
it was fraudulent for Mandel to conceal the information. Other courts have held
that public officials have a fiduciary obligation to supply information material
to governmental decisions. To conceal such information is to deprive the public
of a cognizable right.1 27 Moreover, it is deceptive for a public official to withhold
information material to a governmental decision in which he plays a part.1 28
The viability of the theory that Mandel defrauded the public of material
information thus turns on whether information about the identities of Marl-
boro's owners was material to governmental decisions relating to Marlboro.
Neither the prosecution nor any judge associated with the Mandel case
specifically addressed this question. They apparently just assumed that the
information was material. Yet the only indication that the identities of
Marlboro's owners were material to governmental decisions was the testimony
of certain legislators that they would have been interested in the information
and might have voted differently on matters relating to Marlboro had they
known who were the true owners.1" Surely the law does not require the
disclosure of all information in which a legislator might be interested or which
might affect his vote. To require this would be to allow "materiality" to be
defined by the personal curiosities and prejudices of individual legislators.
This would be a particularly inappropriate standard for determining
whether information is material to a governmental decision, although it may be
125. United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1353.
126. In fact, he lobbied for a race track consolidation bill that, had it passed, would
have benefited Marlboro's owners. Id. at 1355.
127. See notes 93 to 99 and accompanying text supra.
128. See United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 977 (1976). By taking part in a governmental decision, as Mandel did when he
lobbied for passage of the consolidation bill, a public official implicitly represents that he
is acting as a loyal public servant. This is a misrepresentation if, in fact, he is concealing
material information.
129. 591 F.2d at 1354-55. Appellee's Brief at 23.
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a proper test of whether information is material to a private decision. 130 First,
although the private decision maker may be entitled to base his decisions on his
personal biases, the government official is not. He is obliged, as a public
servant, to base his decisions on the public interest. Therefore it would seem
that the only information to which he is entitled is information that bears on
the public interest. Second, in the context of governmental decisions, the concept
of materiality is related to that of public injury, for the theory that a public
official defrauds the public by withholding material information is predicated on
the notion that nondisclosure of such information injures the public. According-
ly, information should not be classified as material to a governmental decision
unless its nondisclosure would injure the public.
When the question whether information is material arises after the fact,
i.e., in the criminal prosecution of someone who withheld particular informa-
tion, it seems appropriate to ask whether the public was harmed by its
nondisclosure. 1 3 1 The public arguably was not harmed unless the undisclosed
information affected the public interest in a way that would have justified
130. The concept of materiality has its roots in the civil law of fraud. One party to a
private bargain may be civilly liable to the other if he misrepresents a fact material to the
bargain. Generally, a fact qualifies as material in this context if it is one to which the
reasonable man would attach importance, i.e., one that would influence his decision to
enter the bargain. W. PROSSER, supra note 95, at 719; James & Gray, supra note 95, at
498. Yet Prosser indicates that a fact is also material if one party knows that the other's
decision would be influenced by it, even though the reasonable man would not attach
importance to that fact. W. PROSSER, supra, at 735-36. To this extent the civil law seeks to
preserve a private individual's opportunity to base his decisions on his idiosyncratic
biases.
131. The reasoning of United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174 (2d
Cir. 1970), indicated that this is the important question even in the context of private
decisions. In Regent the Second Circuit rejected Judge Learned Hand's tacit suggestion
that any information that would affect a decision is material to that decision. In United
States v. Rowe, 56 F.2d 747 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 554 (1932), Judge Hand said
that a man is cheated when "he has lost his chance to bargain with the facts before him."
Id. at 749. In Regent, however, the Second Circuit insisted that this passage should be
interpreted in the factual context of Rowe. 421 F.2d at 1182. Rowe involved a scheme to
sell property by misrepresenting its value. Because the scheme was sucessful, the buyers
received property substantially less valuable than they had been led to believe. The court
in Regent concluded:
[T]he Rowe decision was perfectly accurate in affirming that a wrong has been
suffered when a man is deprived of his chance to bargain "with the facts before him"
where the absent facts are facts material to the bargain he is induced thereby to enter.
Id. (emphasis added). The court then indicated that although true information about the
value of the property was material to the bargain in Rowe, the truth concealed by the
Regent defendants was not material to the bargain involved in that case. The Regent
defendants misrepresented their reasons for offering their products for sale; they did not
misrepresent the value of their products. Although the truth might have affected their
customers' decisions to buy, the court held that the customers had not been defrauded. Id.
They had not been defrauded, the court said, because they had not been injured; the
products they received met their reasonable expectations. Id.
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government officials in making a different decision had the information been
available to them.
132
Previous cases dealing with the public's right to information from public
officials also suggest that this is the only sort of information a public servant is
obliged to supply. The basic premise of these precedents is that a public official
has a fiduciary obligation to serve the public interest. The courts reasoned that
an official is unfaithful to this obligation if he conceals information about his
financial interest in a governmental decision, because his interest adversely
affects the public's financial interest. 133 Perhaps an official's obligation to serve
the public entails a duty to supply any information that affects any public
interest - any information, in other words, that properly could make a
difference in the decision.
If this analysis is correct, the issue in Mandel is whether the public interest
in decisions relating to Marlboro was affected by Mandel's codefendants, rather
than their nominees, being Marlboro's owners. The identities of the owners
might have affected the public interest in a variety of ways. For instance, the
citizens of Maryland had a financial interest in decisions relating to Marlboro,
because the state takes a portion of each Maryland race track's profits.134 Yet
neither the prosecution nor the court suggested that the state was financially
disadvantaged because Mandel's codefendants, not their nominees, actually
owned Marlboro.
Presumably the information might have been material even though it did
not affect the public's financial interest. The public has other legitimate
interests, such as interests in avoiding state involvement with organized crime
and in curtailing monopolies. There was no indication, however, that Mandel's
codefendants were connected with the underworld or that they held interests in
Maryland race tracks other than Marlboro and Bowie. The public also has an
interest in preventing political' corruption. If Mandel and Marlboro's owners
were involved in a corrupt relationship, the nature of that relationship would
have affected the public's interest in decisions regarding Marlboro. If, however,
their relationship was not corrupt, then the owners' friendship with the
governor probably would not have affected the public interest. Nonetheless,
their friendship might have made a difference to certain legislators. The defense
maintained, for instance, that the Marlboro owners concealed their identities for
132. The question whether information is material to a governmental decision only
arises in criminal prosecutions. Because the defendant will be exposed to criminal
penalties if the information is classified as material, perhaps materiality should be defined
more narrowly in a criminal prosecution than in a civil suit. For the civil law definition of
materiality, see note 130 supra. The law dictates that criminal statutes be narrowly
construed, because the consequences that attach to their violation are so serious. See
Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978); United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971). Likewise it seems that the
concept of materiality ought to be narrowly confined when it is transposed from the civil to
the criminal context.
133. See notes 91 to 98 and accompanying text supra.
134. See note 22 supra.
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fear their friendship with the governor would prejudice them in the eyes of his
political enemies. 3 ' That possibility would not make their identities material
under the analysis suggested above.
Under that analysis, the question whether information is material to a
governmental decision ought not to hinge on whether it would have made a
difference to a government official, but on whether it should have made a
difference to him. The Fourth Circuit, of course, might reject this reasoning.
Still, it is surprising that the court did not discuss the issue of materiality. Some
analysis should have been made of whether, or under what conditions,
information about Marlboro's ownership was material, because it was not the
type of information other courts had held to be material to governmental
decisions.
The courts bear the responsibility for defining the parameters of material-
ity, because the mail fraud statute does not address the issue. The question
whether or not the public is entitled to particular information in a particular
case presupposes some guidelines for determining the issue. Without such
guiding principles, the issue will be determined on a case by case, jury by jury
basis. To allow this would be to ignore the principle that the standard of guilt
may not be left to the variant views of the different courts and juries called upon
to enforce a criminal statute.
136
2. Mandel's Codefendants and the Public's Right to Information
In light of the relevant case law, the theory that Mandel's codefendants
could be convicted for defrauding the public of information material to
governmental decisions is even more difficult to justify.137 There simply is no
precedent for the theory that private citizens have an obligation to supply all
information material to governmental decisions.'
38
135. Record, vol. 51B, at 11540.
136. United States v. L. Cohen Grocer Co., 264 F. 218, 220 (1920), aff'd, 255 U.S. 81
(1921).
137. This theory authorized the jury to convict Mandel's codefendants for merely
concealing their identities as Marlboro's owners even if the jury found that these
defendants had not made false representations to government officials.
138. It is difficult to formulate any theory under which Mandel's codefendants would
have been obliged to supply information about the identities of Marlboro's owners. Of
course, government officials did actually request the information. The Racing Commission
asked Cory for the identities of the beneficial owners of the stock listed in his name "as
attorney." Main Brief for Appellants at 33. Moreover, the General Assembly expressed
interest in the identities of Marlboro's owners and requested a list of its stockholders from
the Racing Commission. Appellee's Brief at 22.
These requests, however, did not give the public or the officials a right to this
information, for a private citizen has no obligation to supply all information that
government officials happen to request. At most, these requests demonstrated that
government officials were interested in the information and that their decisions might
have been affected by it. Yet this expression of interest did not establish that the
information was material, much less that the public had a right to the information, even if
it was material, from these defendants.
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In fact, the cases that the panel majority cited as precedent for this theory
were decided on another basis. The majority opinion relied on three cases in
which private citizens were held to have violated the mail fraud statute when
they withheld information from public bodies.139 Yet all of these cases were tax
fraud cases. None held or even implied that the government or the public had
been defrauded of information; rather, the government and the public were
defrauded of money, i.e., of taxes owed.' 4 ° The injury was not to a public right to
information from private citizens, but to the public's right to taxes due from
those defendants.
14 1
There is another case that bears mentioning in connection with the theory
that Mandel's codefendants defrauded the public of information. In United
States v. Castor'4 2 the defendants were held to have violated the mail fraud
statute by participating in a scheme to obtain liquor store permits through the
use of front-men on their applications for the permits. They obtained twelve
permits through this subterfuge, although the state would not have granted
that many to any single group. 143 The court found that the defendants had
deprived other applicants of their opportunities to realize profits from the
operation of liquor stores. 1 44 It specifically declined, however, to consider the
Government's argument that the state agencies granting the permits had been
defrauded of anything.'45 The court recognized an injury to the competitors'
financial interests, not to a public or governmental right to information from
private citizens.
14 6
139. United States v. Feinberg, 535 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir.) (misrepresentation of building
demolition dates to reduce property tax assessment by Cook County, Illinois), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 929 (1976); United States -v. Mirabile, 503 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1974)
(misrepresentation of retail sales to avoid Missouri sales tax), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973
(1975); United States v. Flaxman, 495 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1974) (misrepresentations of
sales to avoid Illinois retailers occupation tax), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1031 (1974).
140. United States v. Feinberg, 535 F.2d at 1005-06; United States v. Mirabile, 503
F.2d at 1065; United States v. Flaxman, 495 F.2d at 345-46.
141. All three of these cases involved misrepresentations to reduce state or local taxes.
See note 139 supra. Each of the governmental bodies in these cases probably had a right to
the information, because presumably the defendants were required by statute to supply
accurate information regarding taxes due. Thus had the courts chosen to do so, they could
have held that the defendants deprived the governments of information to which they had
statutory rights. The situation of Mandel's codefendants was different. Prior to the spring
of 1974, Maryland had no statute requiring disclosure of beneficial interests in Maryland
race tracks. See note 24 supra.
142. 558 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1010 (1978).
143. Id. at 381, 384.
144. Id. at 384.
145. Id.
146. The information withheld in Castor could easily be construed as material to a
governmental decision. True information regarding the identities of the applicants would
have affected the public interest in preventing monopolies. Neither Castor, nor any
decision other than the Fourth Circuit's decision in Mandel, however, has ever even
implied that a private citizen has an obligation to supply all information material to a
governmental decision.
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In fact, in all other cases in which the public's right to information has been
characterized as a right of which the public could be defrauded, the public's
right has been grounded in the fiduciary relationship between a public servant
and the public. 1 47 No other court has even implied that a fiduciary relationship
pbtains between private citizens and the public or that the public has a right to
all material information from private citizens. 48 The Fourth Circuit, however,
upheld the convictions in the Mandel case, which was submitted to the jury on
this theory. Being without precedent, the theory needs some other justification.
Perhaps a court could justify such a theory; the panel opinion did not.
Even if the mail fraud statute could be construed to encompass a public or
governmental right to all material information from private citizens, there is a
serious question whether these defendants could properly be convicted for
defrauding the public or the government of this right. The Supreme Court said
in Bouie v. City of Columbia,149 tan unforseeable judicial enlargement of a
criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto
law, such as Art. I, § 10, of the Constitution forbids." '15 Because there was no
precedent for interpreting the Mail Fraud Statute to encompass schemes to
defraud the public of a right to information from private citizens, the Fourth
Circuit may not have been entitled to rely on this interpretation in upholding
the convictions of Mandel's codefendants.
Furthermore, if a public right to material information from private citizens
is to be recognized, arguably the right should be established by the legislature.
Historically, no governmental right to information from private citizens has
been recognized without a statute requiring disclosure of the information.
5 1
During the time when Mandel's codefendants withheld information about their
ownership of Marlboro, there was no statute requiring disclosure of this
information.'5 2 Further, there was evidence that the practice of submitting lists
of nominees to the Racing Commission was accepted as legitimate by the
147. See notes 95 to 99 and accompanying text supra.
148. In United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827
(1973), a case involving the fiduciary relationship between an employee and his employer,
the court did uphold the conviction of someone outside that relationship. Id. at 514. After
holding that the employee had defrauded his employer of material information, see note 83
supra, the court found that the employee's codefendant was also guilty, not because he had
deprived the employer of information that he had a duty to supply, but because he
participated in the scheme to deprive the employer of information to which it was entitled
from its employee. 477 F.2d at 514. Under this reasoning, Mandel's codefendants would be
guilty only if they participated in a scheme for Mandel to withhold material information,
but not if they simply withheld the information themselves.
149. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
150. Id. at 353.
151. Private citizens are required by law, for example, to provide accurate information
on their income tax forms. See I.R.C. §§ 6012-13. The government has a right to this
information, but no court has ever held that a citizen defrauded the government of
information by violating the tax laws.
152. United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1355; see note 24 supra.
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Commission. 53 Presumably, a private citizen has the right to assume that he
need not supply information unless he is required to do so by statute.
Thus the theory that the Mandel defendants might be said to have
defrauded the public of its right to material information was questionable in two
respects. Was information about the identities of Marlboro's owners material to
governmental decisions? Did the public have a right to the information from
these defendants? Of course, the theory was explicitly endorsed only by the
panel majority, but at least five of the six en banc judges apparently accepted
it.1 54 The panel majority, however, did not deal with the problems involved in
determining the materiality of the information. Furthermore, the panel
majority did not establish the public's right to the information. Although the
rationale of prior political corruption cases might encompass a public right to all
material information from Mandel, a public official, there was no precedent for
the proposition that the public has a right to all material information from
private citizens.
C. The Theory That the Defendants Were Involved
in a Scheme to Obtain Property By
False Representations
The evidence of mail fraud was submitted to the jury on a third theory -
that the defendants were involved in a scheme to obtain property by false
representations.55 In considering the evidence of such a scheme, the jury would
have had to consider a series of questions. For instance, did the general
acceptance, of the practice of submitting lists of nominees to the Racing
Commission negate any inference that the defendants intended to deceive the
Racing Commission? 156 Did the defendants aid and abet Casey and Schwartz in
their deception of the General Assembly?157 Did Mandel know who the true
owners of Marlboro were?154 The guilty verdicts returned on the mail fraud
counts, however, did not necessarily reflect the jurors' answers to these
questions. Instead, the verdicts may have reflected the jurors' response to one or
both of the other two theories discussed above, for the case was submitted to the
jury on all three theories.
D. Conclusion
In ratifying the submission of this case to the jury on all three of these
theories, the Fourth Circuit may have done a grave injustice to the defendants
153. 591 F.2d at 1355; Main Brief for Appellants at 34.
154. See text accompanying notes 62 to 64 supra.
155. See text accompanying notes 43 to 45 supra.
156. The jury was instructed that this practice might bear on the defendants' intent.
Record, vol. 51B, at 11498.
157. The jury was instructed that one person's statement would be admissible against
all parties to "a common plan ... to accomplish some unlawful purpose or to accomplish
some lawful purpose by unlawful means .. " Id. at 11493-94.
158. Mandel denied any such knowledge. Id. at 11530 (statement of Mandel's theory in
the charge to the jury).
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in Mandel. Although all three theories have some basis in the mail fraud
statute and the case law, one was presented to the jury in a confusing manner,
and another was arguably not viable under the circumstances in Mandel. The
Mail Fraud Statute, by its terms and as it has been interpreted in the case law,
reaches schemes to obtain money or property by means of false
representations, 15 9 schemes to defraud the public of its right to the loyal and
faithful services of a public official through bribery, 160 and schemes to defraud
the public of its right to have its officials made aware of material information
when conducting government business.161 These three types of schemes were the
bases of three theories of the evidence presented to the jury.'6 2 The first theory
might have justified the guilty verdicts. However, there is no way to know
whether the guilty verdicts returned by the jurors were premised on this theory
or on one of the other two.
The second theory was presented to the jury without an accompanying
bribery instruction. The crucial question for the jury in regard to this theory
was whether or not Mandel was bribed; thus the verdicts may have been tainted
by the omission of a bribery instruction in connection with the mail fraud
counts.
The third theory did not apply, under the relevant case law, to the
circumstances in Mandel. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit failed to justify the
extension of this theory to the facts in Mandel. Thus if the jurors' verdicts were
premised on either the second or third theory, the defendants may have been
improperly convicted.
V. THE EQUAL DIVISION OF AN EN BANC COURT
Just as the Fourth Circuit's analysis of the mail fraud issues may have
prejudiced the defendants in Mandel, so too, the Fourth Circuit's en banc
procedure may have been unfair to these defendants. In July 1979, the Fourth
Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the convictions of Mandel and his codefendants
by an equally divided court.' 63 The practice of affirming criminal convictions by
equal divisions of the Courts of Appeals must be evaluated in terms of the
concept of en banc power and the purposes of appellate review.
A. Historical Development of En Banc Review and the Practice
of Affirming by an Equal Division
The federal circuit courts were established in 1891164 as intermediate
appellate courts designed to "correct individual injustice[s].' 165 Initially the
159. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
160. See notes 84 to 86 and accompanying text supra.
161. See notes 91 to 99 and accompanying text supra.
162. See text accompanying notes 45, 51 & 114 to 117 supra.
163.. United States v. Mandel, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961
(1980).
164. See Evarts Act, ch. 517, §§ 2-3, 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§§41-46 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
165. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 200 (1976).
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federal circuit courts each consisted of three judges. They eventually were
expanded to handle the increasing case loads in the various circuits, 6 6 but
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), they still sit in three judge panels unless a
hearing or rehearing before the court en banc is ordered by a majority of the
active circuit judges. 167
Section 46(c) codified a 1941 Supreme Court decision holding that the
circuit courts have the inherent power to review cases en banc. 6 In accordance
with rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, they should do so only
"(1) when consideration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain
uniformity of [their] decisions or (2) when the proceeding involves a question of
exceptional importance."' 69 This is the only federal rule dealing with en banc
procedures. It speaks only to the purposes of en banc review. Beyond that, the
individual circuits are free to prescribe their own en banc procedures. 7 '
When the circuit courts sit en banc with an even number of judges, they are
sporadically faced with equal divisions of their members. Because the federal
courts are committed to the principle of majority rule, 171 an equal division
presents a problem. The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that an equal
division of its members will have the effect of affirming the lower court
166. By 1938 all but two circuits had more than three judges. However, at that time
only the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had ever sat with more than three
judges. Comment, In Bane Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 43 FORMHAM
L. REV. 401, 402 (1974) [hereinafter cited as In Banc Procedures].
167. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1976) provides:
Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or division of not
more than three judges, unless a hearing or rehearing before the court in bane is
ordered by a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit who are in regular active
service. A court in banc shall consist of all circuit judges in regular active service. A
circuit judge of the circuit who has retired from regular active service shall also be
competent to sit as a judge of the court in banc in the rehearing of a case or
controversy if he sat in the court or division at the original hearing thereof.
Id.
168. Textile Mills Security Corp. v. Comm'r, 314 U.S. 326 (1941), resolved a conflict
between the Ninth and Third Circuits as to whether the circuit courts had the power to sit
en banc. In 1938 the Ninth Circuit had held that the circuit courts had no such power.
Lang's Estate v. Comm'r, 97 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir. 1938). The petitioners in Textile Mills
challenged the Third Circuit's power to sit en banc to decide the case below. Comm'r v.
Textile Mills Security Corp., 117 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1940). Prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Textile Mills, however, apparently only the District of Columbia Circuit and
the Third Circuit considered the en banc procedure legitimate. See In Banc Procedures,
supra note 166, at 402-03.
169. FED. R. App. P. 35(a).
170. In Western Pac. R.R. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247 (1953), the Supreme
Court said, "The statute f§ 46(c)I deals not with rights, but with power. The manner in
which that power is to be administered is left to the Icircuitl court itself." Id. at 259. The
Court added that in exercising its supervisory power, it would require each circuit court to
devise a procedure for deciding which cases to hear en banc. Each circuit was to see that
litigants would not only understand the procedure, but also have an opportunity to call
attention to circumstances that might warrant en banc consideration. Id. at 260-62.
171. The Supreme Court indicated in Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107 )1869),
that this commitment stems from our common law heritage.
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decision.' 72 As the Court explained in Durant v. Essex,'73 the appellant or
petitioner asks the Court to reverse a lower court's order. Because the court
cannot act without a majority, the equal division leaves the judgment below
standing.'74 An affirmance under these circumstances, being merely a logical
consequence of the Court's inability to act, has no precedential value.' 75 It is
only when the Court acts by a majority that it establishes precedent.
The federal circuit courts have traditionally followed the Supreme Court's
procedure for dealing with equal divisions in en banc proceedings, 7 6 although
no federal rule requires them to do so. When a federal circuit court divides as to
whether or not to reverse a lower court in an original en banc hearing, the
rationale for the Supreme Court's procedure clearly applies. The court, unable to
act without a majority, denies the request to reverse the lower court. When,
however, a circuit court grants a rehearing en banc, there is some question what
judgment remains in force as a result of the court's inability to act.
Is it the judgment of the lower court or the judgment of the panel that the
en banc court reviews and, in the case of an equal division, affirms? Although
this question was a matter of dispute in two circuits until recently, 77 it is now
the uniform practice of the federal circuit courts to affirm the lower court
judgment when the en banc court is equally divided on rehearing. 78 This
172. In Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 191-92 (1972), the Supreme Court pointed out
that this had been its consistent practice since 1825, apparently the first occasion of an
equal division among the members of the Supreme Court.
173. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107 (1869).
174. Id. at 112.
175. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972); Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S.
263, 264 (1960).
176. See note 178 and accompanying text infra.
177. As recently as the 1960's, some courts of appeal judges in the Second and Sixth
Circuits questioned whether an equal division of the en banc court on rehearing would
leave a panel decision standing. In Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery &
Confectionery Workers, Int'l., 294 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1961), aff'd, 370 U.S. 254 (1962), the
court affirmed the lower court judgment by an equal division. Two judges maintained,
however, that under the circumstances, the panel opinion should remain in effect. By 1963
these differences apparently had been reconciled, for in Farrand Optical Co. v. United
States, 317 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1962), the entire court seemed to concur in the decision to
affirm the lower court's decision on one issue when the en banc court was equally divided
on that issue in a rehearing.
The Sixth Circuit's dispute was more serious. In United States v. Osborn, 415
F.2d 1021 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1015 (1970), the court noted that in the
original rehearing by the court en banc, it was equally divided both on the merits and on
the effect of the equal division. Accordingly, it ordered the decision held in abeyance. The
court subsequently adopted a rule dictating that a grant of a rehearing en banc will
automatically vacate the panel opinion. 6TH CIR. R. 14(a).
178. See, e.g., Ginsburg, Feldman & Bress v. Federal Energy Admin., 591 F.2d 752
(D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979); Bankers Life Co. v. United States, 587
F.2d 893 (8th Cir. 1978); Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Holmes, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d
1029 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Walden, 458 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1972); Ramsey v.
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practice finds support in the language of section 46(c). Section 46(c) provides
that a case should be heard and determined by a panel of no more than three
judges unless a hearing or rehearing en banc is ordered. 179 This language
indicates that when the court orders a rehearing en banc, the case is determined,
not by the panel, but by the en banc court reviewing the lower court judgment
directly. Accordingly, an en banc court's response to an equal division should be
the same whether the equal division occurs in an original hearing or a
rehearing.
B. The Problems Inherent in Affirming a Criminal
Conviction by an Equal Division
The essential question is whether the principle of majority rule mandates
that an equally divided en banc court affirm the lower court's judgment.
Although the reasoning behind this practice has a certain logical consistency
about it, there is something disturbing about the prospect of criminal
defendants going to jail, as the defendants in Mandel did, when one half of an en
banc court considers their convictions fatally defective. Arguably, other
principles, equally as compelling as the principle of majority rule, demand a
different result in criminal cases. Further, in criminal cases, a different result
may be as compatible with the principle of majority rule as is the practice of
affirming by an equal division.
The Supreme Court has said that society takes one of its "most awesome
steps" when it deprives an individual of his liberty.1 8 0 Because our system of
justice values so highly the individual's right to liberty, it seeks to ensure that
when society takes this awesome step, the criminal defendant's conviction is
justified both on the facts and on the law. Accordingly, the system guards the
criminal defendant from mistakes of fact. In every criminal case tried before a
jury in the United States, the jury is instructed that the defendant is entitled to
the presumption of innocence and that, in order to convict, the jurors must be
convinced beyond all reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty as charged.
UMW, 416 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 401 U.S. 302 (1971); Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby,
340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 28 (1966).
In fact, with two exceptions, this apparently has always been the practice of the
circuit courts of appeal. Even when the Second Circuit judges disagreed as to which
judgment should be affirmed by their equal division, see note 177 supra, a majority of
them agreed to affirm the lower court judgment. The two exceptions were United States v.
Osborn, 415 F.2d 1021 (6th Cir. 1969), see note 177 supra, and Bulluck v. Washington, 468
F.2d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1972), in which the court reinstated the panel opinion. This latter
decision appears to be an aberration. The District of Columbia Circuit has since held that
an equal division of its members on rehearing has the effect of affirming the district court
judgment. Ginsburg, Feldman & Bress v. Federal Energy Admin., 591 F.2d 752 (D.C. Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979).
179. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1976).
180. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962).
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The right to be found guilty beyond all reasonable doubt is a due process right
guaranteed by the Constitution to every person in the United States.
8 1
The criminal defendant is also protected from mistakes of law. Most states
grant the criminal defendant at least one appeal of right,1 8 2 and a criminal
defendant convicted in a federal court has an appeal of right to the federal court
of appeals for his circuit.1 8 3 The appellate court determines whether the
defendant received a fair trial below.18 4 If the court finds that he might have
been prejudiced by a mistake of law, for instance, by the improper admission of
evidence or improper jury instructions, then the appellate court will reverse his
conviction. In reversing, the court will usually order a new trial.1 8 5 It is
anomalous that a system so solicitous of the criminal defendant's right to the
presumption of innocence and to a fair trial should be willing to send a criminal
defendant to jail when half the judges of an en banc court are convinced that the
defendant did not receive a fair trial below. Yet this is precisely what happened
in Mandel. This practice should be re-evaluated in terms of the basic purposes of
appellate review.
The primary functions of appellate review are to protect individuals against
injustice and to ensure that the law is interpreted and applied uniformly in the
trial courts.'8 6 The two functions are interrelated; the notion that similarly
situated individuals should receive similar treatment before the law is
fundamental to our concept of justice.
When a federal circuit court is evenly divided on the merits of an appeal, it
obviously cannot assure that the law will be interpreted or administered
uniformly. 187 It cannot decide what the law is. Moreover, the next time the same
issue is presented for review, the court might reach a majority decision.
Tomorrow it might accept the same argument that it rejected by an equal
division yesterday. Accordingly, the divided court can not assure that similarly
situated defendants will receive similar treatment. A divided court can,
however, ensure that an individual criminal defendant is not treated unfairly by
181. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970).
182. L. B. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 230 (1939).
183. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 441 (1962); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1294
(1976); FED. R. CRIM. P. 37(a).
184. C. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 26, 37 (1930).
185. Of course, if the court decides that there was insufficient evidence to support a
conviction, the court will simply reverse.
186. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 165, at 2-3; L. B.
ORFIELD, supra note 182, at 32-33; C. LLEWELLYN, supra note 184, at 35-36, 38-39.
187. Commentators generally recognize this as one of the major problems stemming
from equal divisions by en banc courts. Comment, In Banc Procedures, supra note 166;
Note, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Accommodating Institutional
Responsibilities (pt. 1), 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563 (1965); Note, En Banc Procedure in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 220 (1962); Note, United States v. Mandel:
The Problem of Evenly Divided Votes in En Banc Hearings in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 66 VA. L. REV. 919 (1980) [hereinafter cited as The Problem of Evenly Divided
Votes 1.
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reversing his conviction, thereby guaranteeing that he will not receive less
protection than future similarly situated defendants.1 8 8 It is more in keeping
with our system's concern for the individual that the criminal defendant, not the
Government, receive the benefit of an equal division amongst the members of an
appellate court reviewing his conviction.
Moreover, this result may be entirely compatible with the principle of
majority rule. Because a federal criminal defendant has a right to appeal, his
conviction arguably is not final until an appellate court either dismisses his
appeal or affirms his conviction by majority vote. This approach would require a
majority for affirmance.1 8 9
C. The Fourth Circuit's Opportunity to Avoid the
Problems of an Equal Division
The Fourth Circuit did not have to adopt a new approach to an equal
division in order to ensure that the defendants in Mandel were treated fairly.
The equally divided court had neither assured justice for the defendants, nor
settled the law so that it could be uniformly applied in the trial courts. Yet the
court was presented with a valid means of fulfilling both of its obligations. It
could have reached a majority decision had it granted a second rehearing. The
court's refusal to do so is inexplicable.
Shortly after the Fourth Circuit announced the result of the en banc
rehearing in Mandel, Judges Sprouse and Murnaghan joined the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 190 The defendants' petition for a second
rehearing was denied by an equal division of the newly constituted court. 191 In a
strong dissent from the denial, Judge Murnaghan pointed out that he was in the
unique position of being able to assure that the court would reach a majority
decision on a second rehearing. Judge Murnaghan had had a tangential contact
with the case below as a practicing attorney. Accordingly, he could have recused
himself to avoid the appearance of bias. He noted, however, that his connection
with the case was so tenuous that he would not have felt obliged to recuse
himself. He concluded that he properly could have premised his decision
whether or not to participate in a rehearing on the number of other judges
188. A reversal under these circumstances involves the risk that a guilty defendant
will go free, but this risk inheres in any reversal of a criminal conviction.
189. Although this reasoning might justify federal circuit courts reversing criminal
convictions when they find themselves equally divided in an en banc consideration of a
criminal appeal, it is unlikely that the courts would adopt this reasoning. Precedent
weighs heavily against it. Furthermore, this reasoning would not apply to the Supreme
Court when it is equally divided, because criminal defendants have no appeal of right to
the Supreme Court. Yet it is just as disturbing for a criminal conviction to be affirmed by
an equal division of the Supreme Court as by an equal division of an en banc circuit court.
But see notes 196 to 201 and accompanying text infra.
190. United States v. Mandel, 609 F.2d 1076, 1077 (4th Cir. 1979) (denial of
appellants' petition for a second rehearing) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 1076.
1981]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
participating.1 92 In this way he could have assured that an odd number ofjudges
sat for the rehearing, thereby guaranteeing a majority decision.
Judge Murnaghan stressed that the court's failure to decide this case was
particularly disturbing, because it was a case of extraordinary importance. He
said, "This was no ordinary case. Its consequences [for] the entire political
system of the State of Maryland are enormous."1 93 In fact, rule 35 indicates that
there are only two grounds for granting a hearing or rehearing en banc - the
necessity of maintaining the uniformity of the circuit court's decisions or the
exceptional importance of some question in the case.1 94 Assuming that the
Fourth Circuit judges who granted the original rehearing followed this rule, a
majority of those judges must have considered either that the panel opinion
threatened the uniformity of the Fourth Circuit's decisions or that the case
involved a question of exceptional importance.
The en banc rehearing did not maintain the uniformity of the Fourth
Circuit decisions. The court was unable to resolve the question whether or not
Arthur required a bribery instruction in connection with the mail fraud counts.
Regardless of whether the other judges agreed with Judge Murnaghan that this
was an exceptionally important case, it nonetheless "crie[d] out for
resolution" '19 5 because the en banc rehearing left the law of the circuit unsettled.
The Supreme Court has said that the federal circuit courts bear the
responsibility of resolving their internal difficulties and of deciding all properly
presented cases.' 96 Since the Fourth Circuit was assured of being able to decide
Mandel on a second rehearing, there is no apparent justification for its refusal to
grant the second rehearing. In denying the rehearing, the court seemed to
ignore its responsibility to both the public and the individual defendants.
D. A Proposal for a New Approach When Appellate
Courts are Deadlocked on the Appeal
of a Criminal Conviction
Periodically the federal appellate courts have no readily available means of
settling their differences and deciding properly presented cases. They sometimes
find themselves deadlocked in equal divisions without a legitimate means of
breaking the stalemate.197 It may be unfair to affirm criminal convictions under
192. Id. at 1076-77.
193. Id. at 1077.
194. FED. R. App. P. 35(a).
195. United States v. Mandel, 609 F.2d 1076, 1077 (4th Cir. 1979) (denial of
appellants' petition for a second rehearing) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
196. Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U.S. 901 (1957) (per curiam).
197. A recently published Note has suggested two mechanisms for avoiding equal
divisions in en banc proceedings. The Problem of Evenly Divided Votes, supra note 187.
Both are designed to ensure that an odd number of judges will always sit for en banc
proceedings. One involved using fewer than the full complement of en banc judges in the
larger circuits; the other contemplated assigning senior circuit judges to sit for en banc
hearings in the smaller circuits. Neither would assure that the en banc proceedings would
serve the purpose for which they were designed - to ensure that "the active circuit judges
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these circumstances, but the federal courts are presently bound by precedent to
the practice of affirming when equally divided."S' Adoption of a new Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure would overcome the barrier of precedent and
eliminate the injustice of the current practice. The new rule could provide that
when a federal appellate court is equally divided on an issue in the appeal of a
criminal conviction, the court should reverse the conviction.199 The rule should
also require that if the case is to be retried, the justices favoring reversal write
an opinion that would be authoritative only for subsequent proceedings in that
case.
20 0
shall determine the major doctrinal trends of the future for their court." United States v.
American-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 690 (1960) (citing opinion of lower court).
Moreover, whenever an en banc court would be equally divided but for the use of one of
these mechanisms, it is perhaps better that the law of the circuit remain unsettled than
that a precedent be established that does not reflect the thinking of a majority of the
circuit judges.
198. See note 178 and accompanying text supra.
199. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure were promulgated by the Supreme
Court to regulate procedure in all federal appellate courts. Although the individual
circuits may adopt other rules to regulate their own procedures, such rules may not be
inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. FED. R. APP. P. 47. In their
present form, the federal rules might be construed to embrace an implicit commitment to
the common law tradition of affirming by an equal division. Accordingly, any change in
this practice would probably require a new Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure. The
Supreme Court has authority to adopt the proposed rule, however, for Congress has
empowered the Court to promulgate, without congressional approval, rules governing
criminal appeals. 18 U.S.C. § 3772 (1976).
The proposed rule speaks only to equal divisions on a particular issue.
Conceivably a court could be evenly divided on the question whether to affirm or reverse a
conviction without being evenly divided on any particular issue. For instance, in a case
presenting two issues, four judges might vote to affirm on both while two voted to reverse
on one and two voted to reverse on the other. In such a case, a majority would favor
affirmance on each issue, but no majority would favor affirming the conviction. The
proposed rule would not apply in this situation. It would call for reversal only when the
judges are equally divided on at least one issue. That situation is the only one in which the
law is really unsettled and in which justice may demand that the criminal defendant, not
the Government, have the benefit of the equal division.
200. The opinion would have to be authoritative for the retrial; otherwise, the reversal
would be an empty gesture. Whether it should be authoritative in an appeal from the
retrial is a separate question. Under the doctrine of the law of the case, a court of appeals
would ordinarily be bound in a second appeal by its decision in the first appeal. 1B
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.404[1] (2d ed. 1948). Whether a court should be bound by
an opinion that does not represent a decision is debatable. If the initial opinion were not
regarded as establishing the law of the case, then the court would be free to review the
issue on which it was formerly divided and to announce a majority decision if it could
reach one in the second appeal. This would not prejudice the defendant, because the court
would then be establishing precedent, and the defendant would have some assurance that
future similarly situated defendants would be treated in a similar fashion. If, on the other
hand, the initial opinion were regarded as establishing the law of the case, the court would
be bound by it in the second appeal. It would carry no authority beyond proceedings in
that case, however. Thus the court would then be in exactly the same position it now
occupies after an equal division. Although, as now, the court would be unable to resolve
the issue in the case in which the equal division occurs, the product of its equal division
would have no bearing on consideration of that issue in another case.
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The judges voting to reverse in such a case would need to write an opinion
to guide the district court in conducting a retrial.2" 1 If, for instance, the equal
division concerned the propriety of the judge's instructions to the jury, the trial
judge would have to be told what instruction or instructions were suspect and
why. Otherwise, he could not cure the problem. Yet this opinion should be
authoritative only for subsequent proceedings in the particular case. Just as the
courts presently give no precedential value to an affirmance by an equal
division, the reversal and the opinion of the judges favoring reversal should be
accorded no precedential value. Theoretically, any subsequent change in the
composition of the court, or in the thinking of an individual member of the
court, would be as likely to result in a majority that would disagree with the
opinion as in a majority that would adhere to it.
The defendant or defendants in such a case might be treated differently
than subsequent defendants in comparable situations, and this is clearly
undesirable. Yet the same danger inheres in the present practice. In fact, the
danger is unavoidable, for the effect of an equal division in an appellate court
reviewing a criminal conviction must be either to reverse or affirm, and there is
a fifty-fifty chance that a subsequent change in the court will lead to an opposite
result in future cases. The question is whether it is better to risk that an
individual defendant will receive less protection than future similarly situated
defendants or to risk that he will receive more protection than future similarly
situated defendants. The latter seems preferable. The new rule would not
obviate the risk that the law would be applied differently in different cases,20 2
but it would protect the individual defendant.
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit's treatment of the Mandel case was disappointing for a
number of reasons, including:
(1) the court's failure to deal adequately with the mail fraud issues;
(2) the court's failure to clarify the meaning of Arthur; and
(3) the court's failure to grant a second rehearing and decide Mandel, a
properly presented case.
201. The question arises whether the opinion should be published or not. Because it
would be a product of the court's failure to decide rather than a product of its decision, it
might be better to require that it be unpublished. Then no one would be misled into
treating it as authoritative despite its lack of precedential value. As two commentators
have recently observed, however, unpublished opinions interfere with an appellate court's
responsibility to be accountable for its actions. Reynolds & Richmond, The Non-
Precedential Precedent - Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States
Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1978).
202. In a sense, this is always a risk, because there is always a possibility that a court
will overturn precedent. This possibility, however, is much less likely than the one that a
court, having been equally divided on an issue, will later reach an opposite result from the
one effected by its equal division.
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The most glaring problem with the Fourth Circuit's treatment of the mail
fraud counts was associated with the theory that the defendants defrauded the
public of its right to information material to governmental decisions. The panel
majority's analysis of the theory that the public has a right to material
information ignored the difficulties in applying that theory to the circumstances
in Mandel. It failed to deal with two questions: first, whether the information
withheld was material to a governmental decision, and second, whether the
public has a right to all material information from private citizens. Half the en
banc judges overlooked these problems, just as the panel majority did. This is
disturbing, because under the panel majority's analysis, a private citizen can be
exposed to criminal liability for withholding information from government
officials whenever the officials testify that the information might have affected
their decision on a particular matter. If the Fourth Circuit ever reviews another
case prosecuted on this theory, the court should re-examine this analysis and
either repudiate it or deal with the questions it presents.
Finally, Mandel exemplified the problem inherent in the present practice of
affirming by an equal division. When a court affirms a criminal conviction by an
equal division, there is a strong possibility that an individual defendant does
not receive protection that will later be accorded to similarly situated
defendants. A new Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure should be adopted to
eliminate this possibility for injustice. Justice would be better served if the
federal courts were to reverse whenever they are equally divided on an issue in
the appeal of a criminal conviction.
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